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INTRODUCTION 
In 1926 The Methodist Recorder published a tribute to visionary college 
president and holiness scholar Asa Mahan: 
There are two characteristics that often mark great minds-characteristics 
which are antagonistic and apparently irreconcilable. We might designate 
one of these as the philosophic or rationalistic tendency, and the other as 
the mystical or religious tendency. Both of these attributes were found in 
Dr. Mahan, developed to a high degree. I 
The uniting of these orientations gave rise to a life of integrative energy. Asa 
Mahan was at once philosopher and theologian, teacher and pastor, social 
reformer and spiritual guide. Perhaps no fusion was a more pronounced 
expression of Mahan's witness than that of deep, personal intimacy with God 
and broad, uncompromising social action. Spiritual experience and societal 
justice belonged together. 
What about today's Wesleyan and Pentecostal movements? Is the strong 
emphasis upon Christian experience and the transforming presence of God a 
distraction from social justice or does it have liberating effects? Surely the history 
of accessibility and welcome around issues of social class demonstrates one 
important legacy. Yet the passion for experience can degenerate into solipsistic 
practices and individualistic escapism. How might Wesleyan/Pentecostal 
movements celebrate the appropriate subjectivity of experience while 
simultaneously grounding their theological reflection in engagement with a world 
of objective realities and with the demands of social justice? 
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This paper will juxtapose the "philosophic" and "mystical" elements within the life 
and work of Asa Mahan. It will briefly point this synthesis forward by reading Mahan 
through the lens of Karol Wojtyla (john Paul II) . Such a vision of the Christi an li fe is 
rooted in a reconciliation of the subjective and the objective in human existence. The 
subj ec tive quali ties of humanity express the mselves thro ugh an appreciatio n fo r 
interio rity and spiritual experience. The objective qualities of humanity elevate the 
person beyond her or his private experience and demand participation among both 
divine and human community. This relatio nal destiny lives as a kind of objectively 
established "intersubjectivity" between persons and God and among humanity. Such 
intercommunion is exactly what Mahan meant when he explored 'The Fellowship of 
the Spirit. '" It is also precisely what Wojtyla intends when he speaks of "participation" 
or "solidarity."] In articulating a faith that defines the human person as a being for 
re lationship, Wesleyan/ Pentecostal movements possess a powerful resource fo r 
affirming both in timacy wi th God and justice for all of God's people. 
B EYOND OBIECTIVISM AND SUBIECTIVISM' 
Near the end of his life, Asa Mahan published his magnum opus two-volume 
history of philosophy.' Prior to presentation of the complete work, he released the 
eighty-page introductory section as an independent treatise· This abbreviated piece 
served as a synopsis of Mahan's entire metaphysical and epistemological schema. 
In signature fashion, the elder philosopher begins with first principles: 
We now advance to a consideration of the hypothesis which lies at the foundation 
of this entire Treatise, the hypothesis about which all the inductions, deductions, 
expositions, and elucidations of said Treatise revolve. The hypothesis is this: Four, 
and but four, realities ever have been, or by any possibili ty can be, represented as 
realities in human thought. We refer, of course, to spirit and matter, time and space.' 
Ma han continues by categori zing these four rea lities according to the d istinction 
between necessary and contingent ideas. Space and time fall under the designation of 
necessary ideas. Matter and spirit dwell in the realm of contingent ideas. Yet, fo r Asa 
Mahan, knowledge of matter and spirit is just as certain as that of space and ti me; the 
necessary and the co ntingent possess equ al claim to abso lu te certain ty ' Thi s 
epistemological confidence leads Mahan to expound a type of realism. In fact, the 
remainder of his discourse is devoted to advocating this approach in opposition to 
materialism, idealism, and scepticism. 
Mahan understood materia lism in standard philosophical terms, as a doctrin e 
which affi rmed matter as the "only existing substance."· Idealism was described as a 
viewpoint which resolved "all reali ties into mind, or its operations."'o Scepticism denied 
the abili ty to define any fundamental expression of reali ty beyond "mere appearance."" 
Therefore, in one sense, Mahan reiterated the threadbare metaphys ical categories of his 
day and in propounding some manifestation of realism placed himself in the company 
of habitually-dismissed nineteenth-century thinkers. " Yet often overlooked is Mahan's 
impressively calibrated exploration of subject/object relations. 
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If Mahan was so predictably hard on materialism, idealism, and scepticism, it was, 
at least in part, due to his passion for integrating the subjective and the objective in 
human understanding. Not only was materialism critiqued as a fallacious monism of 
the tangible. It was also faulted for its assertion that "knowledge is possible but in its 
objective form, that is, relatively to 'things without US."'ll Likewise, idealism invites 
rebuke not only for its singular emphasis upon the immaterial. It also committed the 
fallacy of proposing that "knowledge is possible but in its subjective form, that is, 
relatively to mind."14 Scepticism not only failed to uphold the possibility of real 
knowledge. It implemented this denial with reference to both subjective and objective 
categories of perception.ls Mahan's affirmation of realism was as much about his 
concern to defend the authority of knowledge in both its subjective and objective 
forms as it was about anything else. 16 
One need not read very far to witness that this integration of the subjective and the 
objective is woven through Mahan's entire philosophy As early as 1 840 he stated that 
"contingent phenomena perceived by the intelligence, are of two kinds, subjective, and 
objective."I ? These contingent ideas of both matter and spirit (as distinguished from 
necessary ideas) are directly linked to objective and subjective reality. Even the very 
nature of law is defined with reference to this dual emphasis. Law, objectively 
considered, refers to action "in conformity with certain rules. "18 Law, subjectively 
considered, refers to "an idea in some intelligent mind." 19 
This delineation becomes particularly critical when Mahan considers the ethical 
aspects of law The differentiation and integration of subjectivity and objectivity signals 
the uniqueness of humanity's moral stature. As Mahan argues, law exists objectively in 
brute or animal creation but lives both objectively and subjectively in people.20 In 
essence, an objectively anchored subjectivity is correlated with free will and the 
"Divine image" in which humanity was created.21 
Thus, Asa Mahan's employment of subject/object typologies ultimately revolves 
around a particular expression of philosophical anthropology. As was commonplace 
for his day, Mahan articulated a type of faculty psychology that identified the 
Intelligence, the Sensibility, and the Will. Within the Intelligence he further located 
three primary faculties: Consciousness, Sense, and Reason.22 This garden-variety (some 
might say uninspired) scholasticism takes an intriguing turn when it engages the 
universe of subject/object relations. 
According to Mahan, Consciousness bears a particular relationship to "subjective 
phenomena," Sense to "objective phenomena," and Reason to "universal and 
necessary truths ."23 These three primary faculties are held to be so significant that 
personal identity and interaction with the world are unfathomable apart from them. 
Critical understandings of self, others, and the relationship between these two realities 
find voice in this triadic structure. 
Late in life, Mahan brought his two-volume history of philosophy to a close with 
these words: 
In all schools of Philosophy in all ages, as well as by the rest of mankind [sicJ, it 
is admitted and affirmed, that in all minds in common there is an absolute 
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consciousness of a knowledge direct and immediate of the Self as an interior 
subject exercising the functions of thought, feeling, and willing, and of the Not-
self as an exterior object, having real extension and form, and of Space and 
Time as absolutely necessary and implied realities2 4 
Self as subject, Not-self as object, and Space and Time as truths of implied knowledge 
correspond to the four realities of spirit, matter, space, and time. The first two (spirit 
and matter} represent contingent ideas perceived through the primary faculties of 
consciousness and sense. The latter two (space and time) represent necessary ideas 
apprehended through the primary facuIty of implied knowledge or reason.2S 
This laboriously close rebuttal of idealism and materialism, as well as scepticism, 
served to avoid the extremes of subjectivism and objectivism. In Mahan's view, only 
when both the subjective and the objective are held in meticulously conceived 
synthesis does a proper anthropology emerge. The subjective or realm of the Self, 
unhinged from the objective or Not-self, is prone to an egocentric subjectivism. The 
objective or realm of the Not-self, unhinged from the Self, is ripe for a dehumanizing 
objectivism. The philosophical framework was thus established for exploring the 
depths of intercommunion between people and between humanity and God. 
THE FELLOWSHIP OF THE SPIRIT/INTERSUB/ECTIVITY By PARTICIPATION 
It is against the backdrop of Mahan's surprisingly supple realism that one must 
approach his doctrine of the Holy Spirit. As the holiness professor's corpus grew during 
a half century of writing and teaching, it acquired a twofold character. On the one side 
were specifically philosophical publications, on the other pieces devoted to Christian 
perfection and the work of the Holy Spirit. In 1870, while president of Adrian College 
in Michigan, Mahan released his landmark series of lectures, The Baptism of the Holy 
Chost.26 The explicit purpose of this book was an exploration of pneumatology and 
Christian experience, but the work also expressed an implicitly relational anthropology 
that was consistent with Mahan's philosophy of subject/object interaction. 
The ninth chapter of this treatise is seminal. Grounded in an exegesis of 1 John, 
"Discourse IX" probed the dynamic of human experience as it illumines that which 
Mahan called 'The Fellowship of the Spirit."27 The language of "fellowship" is not at all 
an imprecise employment of devotional speech. Mahan meant something very 
particular when he invoked this term, something that needed to be differentiated from 
"mere companionship" and from "partnership."28 
Companionship referred to the given existence of two or more minds in the same 
locale and the rudimentary interchange of thought between these minds. Partnership 
implied not only a common proximity and elementary exchange of thought; it also 
included "co-operation for the promotion of common ends."29 As Mahan defined the 
quality and character of human relations, both companionship and partnership fell 
under the rubric of "mere external connection."lD Real fellowship is something higher, 
something deeper, and something much more intimate. 
Two minds may be juxtaposed in "the most endearing external relations."J! They 
may share a certain level of thought with one another. They may even form a 
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partnership for common ends. Yet they may never enjoy authentic fellowship . Mahan 
defines the potential obstruction to fellowship as "principles which may render each to 
the other the object of inward aversion."32 True fellowship, in contrast, entails a 
sympathetic union of "thought with thought" and "feeling with feeling," "sentiment 
with sentiment" and "purpose with purpose." This reciprocal action is further 
described as "an intercommunion, in which each becomes to the other, as it were, 
another self. "33 In essence, superficial companionship and partnership remain 
susceptible to the treatment of one another as mere "objects." Genuine fellowship 
requires the kind of intimacy through which people become selves or "subjects" for 
one another. This intersubjectivity is what Asa Mahan means when he invokes the 
language of fellowship. 
In light of these considerations it is fair to ask whether this kind of relationship is 
possible between humans and God. At first blush, the sort of intensity implied by 
Mahan's "fellowship" might argue against such divine/ human familiarity. One could 
even suggest that only human arrogance would posit a relationship between the finite 
and the infinite whereby a person might consider God as "another self. " 
Philosophically speaking there is a danger of collapsing the other's objectively existing 
subjectivity into one's own subjectivity. In short, Mahan's kind of intimacy can be 
misinterpreted as subjectivism. 
Yet it is precisely at this point that the explication of "fellowship" opens a more 
profound consideration. One is reminded of the words from Karl Barth: 
All communion with this God is barred, of the kind of communion we might 
have with creatures, such that the Thou can be changed by the I into an It or a 
He, over which or whom the I thereby acquires powers of disposal ... The 
Subject of revelation is the Subject that remains indissolubly Subject. We cannot 
get behind this SUbject. It cannot become an object.34 
In a rather paradoxical manner, subjectivism serves to strip the other of appropriate 
subjectivity The confession of God as Self or Subject acknowledges the divine 
prerogative and denies that intimacy with God can ever become a kind of 
manipulative "companionship" or "partnership" in which the finite reduces the infinite 
to an object. 35 Just as subjectivism objectifies the other, an appropriate objectivity 
respects the subjectivity of the other. This painstakingly conceived integration of 
subject/ object relations is at the core of Asa Mahan's "fellowship, " and this 
divine/ human intercommunion blossoms through the work of the Holy Spirit. 
Therefore, Mahan understands the baptism of the Holy Ghost not as some private 
experiential possession (a view that could easily lead to subjectivism) but rather as the 
fulfillment of an objectively situated God/ human intersubjectivity. He refers to I John 1:3: 
You will observe that it is not said, that "our fellowship is with the Father, with 
the Son, and with the Holy Ghost," but "with the Father, and with His Son Jesus 
Christ." It is not with the Spirit that the mind has direct intercommunion; but 
through the Spirit, with the Father and with Christ.36 
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This statement is not an attempt to deprecate the Holy Chost. Quite the contrary, it is 
Mahan's way of maintaining the absolutely unique identity and critical wo rk of the 
Trinity's third person. It is also his way of challenging a solipsistic obsess io n with 
private experience by calling the believer to consideration of wider re lational issues. In 
short, 'The mission of the Spirit, .is to bring the soul into direct and immediate 
inte rcommunion and fe llowship with Cod." l7 Moreove r, this o bj ectively fra med 
fellowship between divine and human subjects serves as a paradigm fo r human 
community. The intersubjectivity of the Cod/ human relationship calls forth a kingdom 
of intersubjectively related people of Cod. 
Asa Mahan's nine teenth-century exposition of "The Fellowship of the Spirit" is 
re markably simila r to the twentie th -century phenome nologica l rea lism of Ka ro l 
Wo jtyla (john PaullD. Wojtyla begins his first major work by exploring 'T he Person as 
the Subject and Object of Action."38 At root is an ontological conviction that proper 
subjectivity can not exist without appropriate objectivity. According to Wo jtyla, "We 
must, then, be clear right from the start that every subject also exists as an object, an 
objective 'something' or 'somebody "'39 Correspondingly, the human person, as a 
particular kind of object, must be described as a "somebody," a rational being who, in 
addition to a necessary objectivity, possesses a unique subjectivity 
The quintessential expression of Wojtyla's integration is found in his philosophical 
opus, The Acting Person (1969/ 1979): ° Here the complexity of subject/ object relations 
te rminates in a conceptual understanding reminiscent of Asa Mahan's "fe llowship." 
Wo jtyla describes this reciprocal dynamic as "Intersubjectivity by Participation."41 In a 
late r article, he clarifies the meaning of this terminology' " . . . 1 conceive participation in 
The Acting Person as a positive relation to the humanity of others, understanding 
humanity here not as the abstract idea of the human being, but. .as the personal self, 
in each instance unique and unrepeatable."42 Further on he continues in language 
almost identical to that of Mahan : 
The thou stands before my self as a true and complete "other self," w hich, like 
my own self, is characterized not only by self-determination, but also and above 
all by self-possession and self-governance. In this subjective structure, the thou as 
"another self' represents its own transcendence and its own tendency toward 
self-fulfillment.4l 
The subjective and objective are therefore integrated in two fundamental ways. First, 
the human subject objectifies the self through the act of consciousness.44 Second, the 
objective reality of the other is affirmed in all of its subjectivity. This really existing 
mutual subjectivity lives as an objective ly referenced intersubjectivity among selves. It 
is not at all surprising that Wojtyla ultimately links this relational anthropology to his 
own understanding of "Life According to the Spirit."45 
THE FUTURE OF DIALOGICAL REALISM 
With the preceding analysis in mind, it is possible to offer some particular suggestions. 
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( I) It may be necessary for holiness people to entertain anew the strengths of some 
carefully delineated realism. This statement must welcome examination, given the way 
realism can be conceived as a simplistic epistemological perspective. Much 
contemporary reflection on nineteenth-century philosophy has rightfully critiqued the 
unsophisticated nature of evangelical realism. If one adds to this the identified 
correlation between realistic epistemologies and the rigidity of fundamentalism, one 
has good reason to be wary of anything that might resurrect the predispositions of 
"common sense."'6 
The practice of contrasting nineteenth-century evangelicalism's purported "na'ive 
realism" with more contemporary kinds of "critical realism" provides further impetus 
for spurning those of Mahan's age as little more than hack philosophers" Yet 
encountering the scrupulously formed contours of Asa Mahan's realism evokes a 
more generous assessment. His epistemology did claim an ability to know things as 
they are, but it did so as a considered alternative to the objectivism of materialism, the 
subjectivism of idealism, and the nihilism of scepticism. When viewed in this context, 
Mahan's philosophy takes on a richer, more subtle quality. The upshot is not so much 
a predictably overconfident theory of knowledge as it is a nuanced relational 
anthropology. Hence, one might argue that Mahan's thought is neither "na'ive" nor 
"critical." It is, rather, dialogical. 
This deliberate juxtaposition of subjectivity and objectivity is at the heart of 
Mahan's pneumatology The baptism of the Holy Ghost represents the apex of 
subjectivity, interiority, and spiritual experience. But it also includes the most 
ontologically profound kind of objectivity, engagement with the other, and affirmation 
of relationship. Religious experience becomes not an end in itself but a gateway to the 
real meaning of solidarity. Both the subjective and the objective are as critical for 
Mahan's notion of Spirit baptism as they are for his epistemology. Thus, one's social 
and solidaristic orientation becomes a bellwether of one's spiritual depth, and one's 
spiritual maturity becomes a measure of one's social and solidaristic authenticity. 
(2) It is precisely this Spirit-inspired "dialogical realism" that beckons comparison 
with the more imaginative emphases of Karol Wojtyla's thought, and here Mahan 
speaks a word for our time and for our future. Wojtyla concludes his seminal work on 
the human person with, among other topics, an analysis of "individualism" and "anti-
individualism."" Individualism roots itself in an extreme form of subjectivism that 
enthrones the private desires of the self to the exclusion of the other Anti-
individualism grounds itself in a dehumanizing objectivism that strips the human agent 
of all dignity. It is no stretch to read in this discussion an anthropological critique of 
both capitalism and Marxism. Wojtyla's philosophical confrontation with "dialectical 
materialism" and its accompanying "objectivism" is now lauded. But his multifaceted 
anthropology has also given rise to a judgment upon capitalism's quasi-idealism and its 
corresponding "subjectivism." In his 1995 encyclical, Evangelium Vitae, John Paul 11 
leveled a post-Cold War broadside at the West and identified a "mentality which 
carries the concept of subjectivity to an extreme and even distorts it."·9 
Given Asa Mahan's own refreshingly well integrated commitment to subject and 
object, one wonders if there might be resources in the holiness heritage for the kind of 
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anthropo logy that will offer an alternative to both Ma rxist anti-individuali sm and 
capita list individua li sm . At present the self-aggrandizem e nt of economic e lites is 
celebrated among a world disillusioned by collectivist failures, but does capita lism in 
the age of globalization and its narcissistic excesses reflect an adequate understanding 
o f the human person? If one conside rs the more dialogica l aspects of both Mahan and 
Wojtyla one must raise significant doubt. The answe r to oppressive objectivism can 
not be a self-absorbed subjectivism. It will remain for future reflection to d evelop an 
adequately detailed articulation of some alternative model. Suffice it to say that this 
"Fe llo wship o f the Spirit," this "Intersubjectivity by Pa rti cipa tion," thi s "dia logical 
rea li sm " sugges ts cru cial anthropol o gical insights ofte n ove rl o oked in tod ay's 
philosophical and theological conve rsation. 
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